There is no evidence of such a concept existing except for our own belief in our 'self,' yet that belief in itself, is not solid enough to make an argument for a soul's existence. This scientific outlook seems slightly dangerous, coming from a man who also professes a belief in Christianity. I would be much more comfortable with such a claim coming from another religious group, say the Buddhists who explain away the human 'self,' referring to the consciousness as merely a ever changing system through which, all of our various parts are joined together.
This bothers me mostly in relation to the soul, as we had discussed in class that Hegel's definition of 'geist' or spirit is the "truth of us-ness" yet I see no way of negating this statement and thus find myself wondering what the "truth of us-ness" really is. I see Hegel's claim that he is searching for truth somewhere in the middle of the two stubborn systems of thought (mystics and formalists) as a bold an worthy task, yet I believe that he is doing so by picking and choosing various isolated thoughts from both systems and using them as if they were absolutely true. Such as the idea that human reason is boundless and contains the capacity to understand all of the rational world. This is a very formalist notion that Hegel picks up and runs with, having not provided adequate backing for this faith. He criticizes Kant and other philosophers for their study of epistemology, yet I think that it is necessary to discuss, and challenge the foundations of understanding in order to affirm that the truths that we discover are the actual truths of nature and not the product of man's wordplay.
On page 6 of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in the tenth paragraph, Hegel explains his belief that reason's power is limitless saying, " The power of the Spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in its exposition." I took this to mean that Hegel sees "the power of the spirit" to mean reason, as his 'spirit' is more like the human mind than an immortal soul. Thus this statement claims that as long as the 'spirit' is willing to push the boundaries and continue on its quest of enlightenment through reason, its power is limitless. Again however, I am caught by the problem that such an all powerful thing as reason would be unable to explain itself, and why Hegel pushes such questioning aside. If he truly believes his statement then he would support such a lofty ambition and dare to attempt an understanding. No, I feel think that the truth is that such study does not adhere to his method of thinking [Dialectical Reasoning] and as such he refuses to give it the proper attention that it deserves.
Using his own argument concerning the need of philosophy within all other sciences on page 41, I see knowledge as being a key point within all branches of philosophy. If Hegel uses such an argument to show the necessity of studying philosophy, I will in turn use it to show the necessity of studying the understanding of knowledge. If such study ends in an infinite regression, then perhaps the Holistic answer to such a problem is that the regression itself is indeed the entire process.
Something that has come to bear in postmodern philosophy is the question of what epistemology seeks to accomplish, and whether that goal is really something worth pursuing. When we view human life as a process of change, or when we reject essentialism—that is, the belief that there is something inherent in human beings by virtue of which they are human—a search for the absolute becomes somewhat trivial. We'll get to this idea in much greater detail with Nietzsche, but the reason that it's relevant here is that we see the seeds of this process-oriented view in Hegel's work.
ReplyDeleteEpistemology, at least in the way that the modernists approach it, is the attempt to find a sort of permanent framework for inquiry, which is to say that the goal is to formulate a system into which we can input our questions and come out with an answer, or Truth. Hegel is still hanging onto the idea that such a framework is possible, and we can see similar sentiments extending into the 20th-century philosophies of Bertrand Russell, which posit logic as the key to understanding.
Starting with Nietzsche and continuing through the pragmatists, existentialists, and postmodern philosophers like Rorty and Foucault, we see an emphasis on perspectivism, which means that there are no absolute truths, but simply information interpreted in different ways. This means that much of reality is based on how we choose to explain it. If we take on this view, a search for the absolute is no longer productive as a philosophical trajectory.
I'm not saying that it's wrong, necessarily, to pursue a greater understanding of knowledge; however, consider the practicality of engaging in a process of infinite regress—how would it prove useful?
Colin, I found an issue with Hegel's want to negate the negations. I feel as though such a path wouldn't necessarily help us figure out anything, but instead help us figure out what we haven't figured out yet. I believe we have to be completely sure of what we know in order to move forward with our reasoning, but I have trouble with Hegel's methods.
ReplyDeleteKip, I think you actually helped me to identify my own problem with Hegel's reasoning. It is for sure, as you said, that his method leaves you wanting more than you gained. It seems a bit like a cop out. But then the question arises; What method stands firmer than Hegel's Dialectical Reasoning?
ReplyDeleteI think one of Hegel's problematic issues here is that he is being a little unreasonable about reason itself. Like you said, his "blind faith" in the power of reason and uncritical eye seem a little counterintuitive for one who values reason so much. Even reason itself must be dealt with reasonably.
ReplyDeleteI simply question the value of epistemology. Putting the problem of infinite regress aside, what is the true purpose of epistemology? To give us greater certainty in what we believe we know about the world around us? If the answer to this is yes, then I fail to see why such an achievement is necessary. Take, for instance, a watch and the way it tells time. I know nothing about the way a watch works and yet I use it to gain information about the time. The minute hand on my watch strikes 12 every time the Rhodes bell tower rings, signifying to me that its mechanics work properly when compared to other time keeping devices. While I have no idea why the strange combination of wheels and levers inside a watch force it to reflect the correct time of the world around me (leaving all arguments about the relativity of time out of the matter), I have no less certainty that the time it tells me is true. Similarly, I do not feel I need to understand how my knowledge comprehension works in order to have certainty in my knowledge. Knowing it in the first place is good enough for me.
ReplyDeleteAh, when I first started learning about epistemology I felt similarly. But recently I have changed my opinion. Using your own example of a watch, are you sure that it is telling you the true time? Let me explain- as the battery in the watch dies, the second hand ticks slower, showing how easily the 'truth' of your time can be altered. Now consider if the driving force of our knowledge or even our process of gaining knowledge, were to somehow be centered on something as unstable as a battery, how easy it would be for our conception of truth to be deteriorated. Perhaps you will say that our knowledge is, unlike a battery, more concrete, yet I challenge you- how do you know?First off, without an understanding of our process of obtaining knowledge how can you be sure that your certainty in your knowledge is correct? (not trying to attack your position, I am merely making a point) Secondly, your comparison to a watch fails a second test as there are those people who do understand the way a watch works. It has already been understood, and we trust them to be correct in their dealing with our timepieces. Thus we as philosophers should be the 'clockmakers' of epistemology.
ReplyDeleteAs I said in my example, I have confidence in the accuracy of my watch because it corresponds to other time keeping pieces such as my microwave and the Rhodes bell tower. But yes, like you said, there are some people who do understand the way a watch works. My counter point about this is that even if I did know how a watch worked, I could not verify that it was telling the right time except in correspondence to the world around me. If my watch says its 4:30 in the morning, but I look outside and it's sunny like midday, I can assume that my watch is set incorrectly. Even if I understood how it worked and could verify that my watch was not broken, I do not know if it is telling the truth without some reliance on outside sources. Similarly, my knowledge is dependent on outside sources, so even if I understood how my mind garnered knowledge, this would be useless information without the world around me as an object of knowing. I definitely understand all the points you have made, but I guess what I'm trying to say is I also understand why Hegel skips over this question his work. It seems completely unnecessary to what he is really in search of.
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