In paragraph 86 of the introduction, Hegel draws a distinction between different types of objects. There is the in-itself and the being-for-consciousness of the in-itself. For me, it is not entirely clear what Hegel has in mind here. He refers to the former as the object’s essence and explains the way in which this version of the object is transformed into the latter version by our gaining knowledge of the object. This leads me to believe that the term in-itself is describing the object’s existence that is independent of our consciousness (perhaps, something like Kant’s noumena.) However, in the same paragraph he explains that this type of object stems from the consciousness “knowing something,” a characterization that clearly contradicts the idea of the in-itself as something that exists independent of consciousness.
For the sake of this post, I’ll go with my original, understanding of paragraph 86 while remaining aware that the point I am about to try to make extends upward, rather uneasily, from the shaky foundation of a possibly erroneous interpretation. Once again, the difference between the in-itself and the being-for-consciousness of the in-itself, by my understanding, is that the former refers to an object’s existence apart from our conscious awareness of that existence. The latter describes the knowledge of the object that has been constructed by our consciousness upon our encounter with the object. I think that experience, for Hegel, is simply the process by which the consciousness encounters the object and constructs this knowledge. In other words, experience is the transformation of an object in-itself to a being-for-consciousness.
Earlier in the introduction, Hegel mentions cognition and attempts to dismiss philosophy’s suspicion of it—the idea that it can’t be trusted or that it may be misleading us—as absurdity. He argues that “troubling ourselves with such useless ideas and locutions about cognition” (48), is a waste of effort that should be abandoned. He seems to be implying that we should simply take what is given to us through cognition, our experience, for granted, and focus our attention instead on deriving knowledge from this experience.
While I strongly support a shift away from seemingly meaningless metaphysical concerns and towards a more practical subject, I wonder if Hegel runs the risk of accidentally advocating an end to philosophy. He deems debates over the conditions for the possibility of experience—an undoubtedly philosophical debate—a waste of time. Instead he wants to focus on accumulating experiential knowledge or knowledge of the objects around us. Is this not an entrance into the realm of the sciences? If Hegel is right, once he is done explaining the way in which the consciousness achieves this experiential knowledge, what further role could philosophy play?
I think part of the reason Hegel is so critical on philosophizing about consciousness in terms of the divides between object in-itself and being-for-consciousness is because of the conclusion that he comes up with at the end of the introduction. In paragraph 87, he says that when we have a distance between these two understandings of an object, a reversal of consciousness occurs in which what we previously thought was our conception of the object in-itself becomes the conception of the object's being-for-consciousness and a new concept of the object in-itself is created. But he says that this reversal is nothing we have awareness of! That we naturally update our concepts of object in-themselves through experiencing new objects being-for-consciousness. Since he resigns this task of new understanding to the control of our own mind, it doesn't seem like expounding upon the complexities of consciousness is worth our concern.
ReplyDeleteMaybe philosophy could teach us to interpret new objects that challenge us so that we may lead our consciousness to making these new connections. I'm sure Hegel will offer more resolution to your question in the first chapter (or maybe not.) I do really like how you explained the two types of objects. Your description seems to be sound and solid, aiding me in my own grasp of the concepts.
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This is a good and attentive post, Zach. While I find your conclusion valid, Im not sure if Hegel is advocating an end to philosophy, but rather saying that philosophy and its components (i.e. metaphysics and epistemology) are a progressive means of discovering truth through experiential knowledge. For me, Hegel seems to posit a system for understanding philosophy where “all that is left for us is to simply look on”. Like yourself, I find Hegel’s epistemology a little discouraging to the subject of philosophy because it seems to undermine the importance of philosophy as a study. I think what Hegel is trying to argue is that philosophy (as the pursuit of Truth) always is and always will be, as long as we have consciousness.
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