Friday, January 29, 2010

So Zach's blog got me thinking about the discretion between our conception of an object being-in-itself and our conception of an object being-for-us. B-i-I is like our understanding of the object as a whole, of what it means to be x. B-f-U (haha) is like our working knowledge of the object, or how the object we can quantify individually fits into our concept of the object b-i-i.

This distinction reminds me of Plato's cave in that there is a difference between what we see as an object (being-for-us) and what we perceive as the essence of the object (being-in-itself.) For Hegel, experience brings to light a gap between the object in-itself and for-us. In paragraph 86 Hegel tells us how the mind goes about reconciling the discretion, which is, to my understanding, a process which we cannot control. In this process, our mind shifts our schemata and our knowledge of the absolute.

For Plato in his cave allegory, there is more of a distinct difference in the way on object actually is (in the sun) and how it appears to be (shadows on the cave wall.) Plato places much less burden on the mind to transform our ideas, even going so far as to suggest that once we understand the object in-itself, we will no longer be satisfied with the images that project a shadow of the object. Plato thinks that there is an objective truth outside of ourselves that we can tap into through experience. Hegel thinks that experience is also the key in furthering our understand of the world as both itself and for us.

Plato sees us as bound individuals more than Hegel, which is where I think Hegel proves his authority. Hegel's explication of consciousness, even in the introduction, seems to attribute the mind with all necessary and natural powers of completely comprehending knowledge, whereas Plato thinks that our minds need to be freed from the confines of accepting the objects as they appear. I like that Hegel places such trust on the human mind's ability to sort out knowledge and constantly integrate new experience into our understanding of the world, making truth much more fluid. Plato's cave allegory is a bit all-or-nothing where Hegel's ideas allow for the mind to make slower, more gradual and solid progress. Knowledge is not overwhelming for Hegel where Plato chalks off most of the populous as shadow-absorbing drones incapable of sorting through the truth without the proper tools.

Just thought the comparison was interesting, if not entwined. Any thoughts?

ae

3 comments:

  1. This is a very interesting point. I'm glad you decided to write about it because it really gets me thinking. I agree with you that I prefer Hegel's view on this one. I find the philosophy of the mind really fascinating and I like how Hegel thinks that the mind is capable itself of learning and understanding. I think it is a much more manageable way of looking at this topic. While I do have respect for Plato's forms, the concept can be difficult to grasp. Plato might say Hegel is taking the easy way out on this one, but I like Hegel's idea that the mind is a tool to help us with our learning. Overall a very interesting post, nice job.

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  2. I'm unsure of whether Hegel believes that it's possible to know a thing as a being-in-itself. It seems to me that the only information we really have is of an object as being-for-us; further access to its being would be privileged, right?

    We could probably even take it further than that—if we reject knowable essences (or essences, period), then it's impossible for a thing to be-in-itself; the purpose of anything is contingent on perception, even when referring to human beings. I don't even have knowledge of myself as a thing-in-itself, because I don't have a real understanding of myself as a whole being—or at least I won't until the end of my life (and maybe not even then!). This seems to be in line with Hegel's idea that understanding is a process, not a single point of knowledge.

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  3. Despite my post, I think Mark's point is correct. I don't think Hegel believes that objects have essences that exist independently of our consciousness. I'm thinking that many of us have simply made this interpretation because we have been mislead by the name of the term 'in-itself.'

    The reason I say this is because, in paragraph 86 of the introduction, Hegel explains that, "consciousness knows something; this object is the essence or the in-itself..." (55). This statement seems to explicitly dismiss the possibility of 'in-itself' referring to the kind of independent essences that Plato is speaking of. Clearly these are tied to some stage of our awareness of objects. However, I'm still confused. What then does Hegel mean by the in-itself? I get the impression that it is something more raw (and by raw I guess I mean less prepared by the consciousness) than the being-for-us, and being-for-us seems to refer to our mental image of the object that our consciousness has constructed after acquiring some understanding of that object. What do y'all think?

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